Life Support for Deep Space and Mars by Jones, Harry W. et al.
44th International Conference on Environmental Systems ICES-2014-074 
13-17 July 2014, Tucson, Arizona 
 
Life Support for Deep Space and Mars 
Harry W. Jones1 
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, 94035-0001 
Edward W. Hodgson2 
Formerly Technical Fellow, Hamilton Sundstrand Space Systems International (HSSSI) 
Mark H. Kliss3 
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, 94035-0001 
How should life support for deep space be developed? The International Space Station 
(ISS) life support system is the operational result of many decades of research and 
development. Long duration deep space missions such as Mars have been expected to use 
matured and upgraded versions of ISS life support. Deep space life support must use the 
knowledge base incorporated in ISS but it must also meet much more difficult 
requirements.  The primary new requirement is that life support in deep space must be 
considerably more reliable than on ISS or anywhere in the Earth-Moon system, where 
emergency resupply and a quick return are possible.  Due to the great distance from Earth 
and the long duration of deep space missions, if life support systems fail, the traditional 
approaches for emergency supply of oxygen and water, emergency supply of parts, and crew 
return to Earth or escape to a safe haven are likely infeasible. The Orbital Replacement Unit 
(ORU) maintenance approach used by ISS is unsuitable for deep space with ORU's as large 
and complex as those originally provided in ISS designs because it minimizes opportunities 
for commonality of spares, requires replacement of many functional parts with each 
failure, and results in substantial launch mass and volume penalties. It has become 
impractical even for ISS after the shuttle era, resulting in the need for ad hoc repair activity 
at lower assembly levels with consequent crew time penalties and extended repair timelines. 
Less complex, more robust technical approaches may be needed to meet the difficult deep 
space requirements for reliability, maintainability, and reparability. Developing an entirely 
new life support system would neglect what has been achieved. The suggested approach is 
use the ISS life support technologies as a platform to build on and to continue to improve 
ISS subsystems while also developing new subsystems where needed to meet deep space 
requirements.  
Nomenclature 
4BMS = Four Bed Molecular Sieve 
ARS = Atmosphere Revitalization System 
CDRA = Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly 
DSLS = Deep Space Life Support 
ECLSS = Environmental Control and Life Support System 
EVA = Extravehicular Activity 
GER = Global Exploration Roadmap 
ISS = International Space Station 
LCC = Life Cycle Cost 
LEO = Low Earth Orbit 
LOC = Loss of Crew 
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MPCV = MultiPurpose Crew Vehicle (formerly Orion) 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
OGA = Oxygen Generation Assembly 
OGS = Oxygen Generation System  
ORU = Orbital Replacement Unit 
Pr(LOC) = Probability of Loss of Crew 
RO = Reverse Osmosis 
SFWE = Static Feed Water Electrolysis 
SPWE = Solid Polymer Water Electrolysis 
SSF = Space Station Freedom 
TIMES = Thermoelectric Integrated Membrane Evaporation System 
TRL = Technology Readiness Level 
UPA = Urine Processor Assembly 
VCD = Vapor Compression Distillation 
WPA = Water Processor Assembly 
WRS = Water Recovery System 
I. Introduction 
HIS paper considers life support for deep space missions and Mars. What life support system is needed and how 
should it be developed?  
NASA has the goal of sending humans to Mars, but it does not have a specific Mars mission. However NASA is 
currently developing two major capabilities needed for the Mars mission, a heavy lift launch rocket and a reentry 
capsule. There are no current programs to develop other capabilities needed for Mars such as a deep space transit 
habitat, a Mars lander and ascent vehicle, or a Mars surface habitat. Both the transit and surface habitat must support 
the crew for a year or more using resources sent with the crew or previously put in place. The crew’s dependency on 
the transit and surface habitats’ Deep Space Life Support (DSLS) systems is a major risk to the crew, probably 
exceeding the risk of launch or reentry (Jones, 2013b).  
The DSLS for Mars is usually assumed to be a recycling life support system similar to the ISS system. It should 
be based on ISS life support but must meet unique deep space mission requirements. The DSLS must have much 
higher reliability, reparability, and availability, since consumables resupply, unplanned parts delivery, or emergency 
crew return are much more difficult than on ISS or anywhere in the Earth-Moon system. A matured and upgraded 
ISS life support system is unlikely to meet DSLS needs. A specifically dedicated effort is needed to develop DSLS.  
The ISS life support architecture and the on-board system itself should be used as the starting point and 
supporting platform for DSLS development. The suggested approach is to redesign or replace critical subsystems as 
needed, one by one, to achieve the needed high reliability. A long test time is needed to verify low failure rates and 
to gather data needed to plan for spare parts and maintenance.  
It seems inevitable that in time we will accomplish all our hoped for space missions. We will return to the Moon 
and establish bases. We will establish space stations beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) in the Earth-Moon system. We 
will visit Mars and establish bases there. Expeditions will be made to the asteroid belt and the Jovian moons. The 
exploration of space will lead to a major human expansion, the human settlement of near-Earth space, the Moon and 
Mars, and the use of resources from the asteroids and moons of Jupiter. Affordable, reliable life support will be 
needed for the first long lonely trips in deep space, to Mars and the asteroids, with no safe havens and few abort 
options.  
Any anticipated human path into space could be wrong, but the solar system is a given. When we travel beyond 
the Earth-Moon system into deep space, to Mars, we will need highly reliable long duration DSLS. We should start 
now to develop the most difficult life support system, a high reliability microgravity transit system. It is needed for 
our first step beyond the Earth-Moon system.  
Do we need a Mars mission before we develop the DSLS? The Apollo program showed that a NASA mission 
with urgency, focus, and coordination can produce magnificent results. But NASA also develops capabilities step by 
step, as in building the shuttle and using it to build space station. We are now developing a launch system and crew 
capsule without a defined mission. The Constellation Program, going to the Moon, Mars, and beyond, showed that 
having a mission does not ensure all planned elements are developed. Limited funding put first things first. The 
Apollo-style launch system and crew capsule were well begun but little effort was spent on reaching the Moon and 
none on Mars. And the Moon preparations ignored the Mars requirement for high reliability life support (Green and 
Watson, 2008; Nejad et al., 2009; Jones, 2010) and cancelled the methane rocket intended for Mars ascent (NASA, 
T 
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2006, Jones, 2013a; Wooster, 2007). An ambitious mission with incremental funding became a first step mission, an 
unappealing long delayed return to the Moon. If reaching deep space and Mars is our goal, developing DSLS is the 
means, before and after the mission is defined.  
A DSLS using stored oxygen and water and carbon dioxide removal material would be highly reliable, but 
would have very high mass and be difficult to launch. A recycling DSLS requires will require long and costly 
development and test to ensure its reliability. If a Mars mission is initiated on a short schedule and reliable recycling 
DSLS has not been developed, mission planners may be forced to use high capacity propulsion systems with 
complex multi-rendezvous schemes (Jones, 2013c; Jones, 2012; Jones, 2014b).  
II. Space station and deep space life support 
Plans for a Mars mission usually assume that the life support system will be similar to the International Space 
Station (ISS) Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) (Connolly, 2000; Drake, 2009). The ISS 
ECLSS is largely an operational oxygen and water recycling life support system. Its systems architecture was 
designed and its subsystem technologies selected based on decades of research and development.  
The ISS is the only current long-term human occupied microgravity platform, and provides a unique test bed for 
identifying microgravity problems and testing improvements. The ISS ECLSS is a landmark achievement that 
demonstrates the fundamental systems architecture of long duration partial recycling life support. The development 
of DSLS must be based on this store of knowledge.  
A. Developing DSLS by maturing ISS ECLSS 
The current approach to developing the DSLS is through ISS ECLSS maturation and upgrades.  
“Living in space for long durations with little or no resupply of water and oxygen is a fundamental capability 
that is being matured through day-to-day operations on the only platform capable of the task – the ISS. This is 
because the technologies dealing with gases and liquids are highly dependent on the gravity environment. The 
ISS Programme is using routine upgrades of the current life support systems to increase operational availability 
and reduce system mass, consumables, and power needs beyond the current technology.” (ISECG, 2013, p. 27) 
“The ECLSS technical community has developed a general roadmap framework summarized herein to 
pursue short-duration operations through development of the MPCV ECLSS and long-duration operations by 
utilizing ISS-derived ECLSS capabilities. … In the current NASA environment, completing the MPCV ECLSS 
hardware development, performing targeted ISS demonstrations to address existing reliability issues and add 
capabilities, and pursuing a rigorous ground testing program will drive us to effective solutions for the next steps 
of human exploration beyond low earth orbit.” (Metcalf, et al., 2012)  
Space habitat designers support the current consensus that the way to develop DSLS is to improve the ISS 
ECLSS. But the limitation has been noted that “ISS does have two key differences from the actual exploration 
environment that will be experienced beyond LEO,” space radiation and spacecraft atmosphere (Hodgson et al., 
2013). A third important difference is in operations, since the frequent crew changes, resupply, and waste removal 
on ISS will not occur in deep space.  
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B. The ISS ECLS 
The ISS ECLSS is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The ISS life support system.  
 
As shown in Figure 1, the ISS life support system contains atmosphere, water, and waste recycling processors. 
The four bed molecular sieve (4BMS) carbon dioxide removal system is designed to allow the carbon dioxide to be 
vented to space or to be delivered to the Sabatier carbon dioxide reduction system. The electrolysis oxygen 
generator provides oxygen directly to the cabin atmosphere. The hydrogen can be vented overboard or used for 
carbon dioxide reduction.  
Waste hygiene water and cabin condensate is stored and routed through the potable water processor to a potable 
storage tank. Resupply water delivered by Progress or other resupply vehicles is usually run through the water 
processor before potable use. Urine is pumped from the urinal to the urine processor and the distillate is combined 
with other wastewater. The commode bags and compacts feces. Solid wastes and feces are usually loaded into 
Progress and burned up during Earth reentry. (Diamant and Humphries, 1990; Carrasquillo and Bertotto, 1999; 
Bagdigian and Ogle, 2001)  
Major ISS ECLSS technologies are listed in Table 1.  
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Table 1. ISS ECLSS technologies.  
ISS assembly ISS technology 
Atmosphere Revitalization System (ARS) 
Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) Four Bed Molecular Sieve (4BMS) 
Sabatier Reactor Subassembly (SRS) Sabatier 
Oxygen Generation System (OGS) 
Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) Solid Polymer Water Electrolysis (SPWE) 
Water Recovery System (WRS) 
Water Processor Assembly (WPA) Multifiltration 
Urine Processor Assembly (UPA) Vapor Compression Distillation (VCD) 
C. The ISS ECLSS technology selection process 
The space station technology selection process was reported in a 1992 NASA Technical Memorandum. 
(Carrasquillo, Carter, et al., 1992) This technology selection effort was originally for Space Station Freedom (SSF). 
The selected SSF ECLSS technologies and alternates are given in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. The selected SSF technologies and the earlier baseline and alternates.  
Function SSF selected earlier  SSF baseline earlier  SSF alternate 
Carbon dioxide removal 4BMS 4BMS  
Carbon dioxide reduction Sabatier Bosch Sabatier 
Oxygen generation SFWE SFWE SPWE 
Potable water processing Multifiltration Multifiltration RO 
Hygiene water processing Multifiltration RO Multifiltration 
Urine processing VCD TIMES VCD 
(Technology acronyms not identified in Table 1 are Static Feed Water Electrolysis(SFWE), Reverse Osmosis 
(RO), and Thermoelectric Integrated Membrane Evaporation System (TIMES).)  
 
The SSF technology selection process can be summarized as follows.  
1. Candidate SSF technologies were identified.  
2. Technologies of low technical maturity were eliminated. 
3. Trade studies considering safety, resource requirements, performance, reliability, maintenance, and 
complexity were used to select baseline and alternate candidates for each SSF technology. (Table 2)  
4. The baseline and alternate SSF candidates had prototypes developed and were compared using 
quantitative and qualitative criteria. One baseline technology, 4BMS, had no alternate. One choice, 
Sabatier over Bosch, was made quantitatively, based on lower launch mass and resupply savings. The 
other four choices were based on qualitative justifications. In two of these cases the baseline was 
chosen, in the other two the alternate. (Table 2)  
The ISS technology selection was based on the SSF selection, but one SSF chosen baseline technology (SFWE) 
was later replaced by its SSF alternate (SPWE). The three SSF baseline technologies not selected (SFWE, RO, 
TIMES) appeared almost as good as those selected (SPWE, Multifiltration, VCD). High technical maturity was the 
most important selection factor.  
The ISS ECLSS design process raises several interesting issues. The first technology screening eliminated low 
technical maturity technologies. The baseline and alternate subsystem bench testing began in 1986. Although 
schedule pressure seems a poor justification given the more than twenty years that elapsed before flight, selecting 
for high technical maturity reduces development cost and risk as well as schedule. Should high technical maturity be 
the most important selection factor?  
The ISS ECLSS was not designed using alternate system architectures that were traded-off at the system level. 
The component technologies were traded head-to-head within the standard recycling system architecture. Could an 
alternate ECLSS architecture, for example using carbon dioxide electrolysis, be considered? 
Not all the ISS ECLSS technology selections were clearly better than their alternates. The candidate technology 
pairs were compared qualitatively and in detail based on prototype testing, but no overall single figure of merit was 
developed. The Equivalent System Mass was not computed but later became the standard metric in ECLSS design. 
The three technologies chosen for oxygen generation, water purification, urine purification were selected based 
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more on qualitative than quantitative justifications. All three changed between SSF baseline identification and ISS 
selection. Would different requirements produce different selections?  
The stated issues have important implications. Since only high technical maturity technology is considered for 
flight, any new technologies for deep space must be flight proven. The fundamental recycling architecture of ISS has 
remained unchanged for decades and a different one is practically unthinkable. But alternate technologies that fit 
within the ISS architecture are of great interest.  
D. The ISS ECLSS needs improvement 
A paper by ISS ECLSS team members written before the ISS Node 3 was launched suggests that improvements 
in the ISS ECLSS are needed.  
 “The baseline environmental control and life support (ECLS) systems currently deployed on board the 
International Space Station (ISS) and that planned to be launched in Node 3 are based upon technologies selected 
in the early 1990’s. While they are generally meeting or exceeding requirements for supporting the ISS crew, 
lessons learned from years of on orbit and ground testing, together with new advances in technology state of the 
art, and the unique requirements for future manned missions prompt consideration of the next logical step to 
enhance these systems to increase performance, robustness, and reliability, and reduce on orbit and logistical 
resource requirements.” (Carrasquillo, Bagdigian, et al., 2004)  
Problems cited include high power consumption, difficult maintainability and logistics, sensitivity of several 
components to particulates and fouling, gravity related problems in multi-phase fluid flow and separations, and the 
lack of fine particle settling in microgravity. There are potential improvements in robustness, performance 
efficiency, and expanded capability. These can be obtained by a more integrated design approach and by “a focused, 
functionally-based systems engineering approach to specifying the ECLS system and developing the process 
design.” (Carrasquillo, Bagdigian, et al., 2004)  
(Carrasquillo, Bagdigian, et al., 2004) also make clear the absolute necessity of on-orbit operational experience, 
especially over the long term. The transport and accumulation of fine particles in microgravity caused problems with 
ventilation fans, smoke detector, 4BMS, and the water processor Volatile Removal Assembly. ISS ECLS systems 
could not have been exposed to such debris loads during development testing or flight hardware ground testing. In 
addition to discovering operational failure modes, it is necessary to acquire operational experience with ECLS 
equipment to fully understand maintainability needs. See also (Carrasquillo, Wieland, et al., 1996) for a similar 
discussion.  
E. Is maturing ISS ECLSS the right path to DSLS? 
The ISS ECLSS is a landmark achievement on the path to space. All future space ECLSS will be descended 
from the ISS ECLSS. The DSLS used on early deep space missions is expected to be similar to the ISS ECLSS in 
architecture and basic technologies. However, the optimum DSLS would not be the best system for ISS, since it 
would not use the rapid resupply and repair options available in LEO. Conversely, a matured and upgraded ISS 
ECLSS may not be the optimum DSLS for Mars, since it could lack the high reliability needed, fail to incorporate 
capabilities required to support EVA intensive surface missions, and incur relatively high expendables and 
consumable resupply mass penalties while still meeting ISS needs effectively. Still, the ISS ECLSS is the obvious 
foundation for developing the DSLS. The DSLS would benefit by reversing the recent trend toward “greater 
emphasis on hardware that benefit ISS” (Hodgson et al., 2013) to instead focus on utility for deep space missions.  
The basic architecture and candidate subsystems for recycling life support have long been well known. An 
innovative independent DSLS test bed to fly on ISS or in a spacecraft in the Earth’s vicinity has been proposed. 
ECLSS will in time move beyond ISS in many areas and may adopt fundamentally different architectures and 
incorporate technologies not anticipated today. There is now a broad community consensus behind the current 
approach. The need for a very high level of maturity and confidence creates a formidable barrier to introducing 
novel solutions for our first missions into deep space. Nonetheless, it might be useful to deliberately develop 
possible alternate architectures and investigate innovative technologies as part of the planning for the DSLS.  
Upgrading ISS ECLSS and developing DSLS both start here and now with ISS ECLSS. They will share 
common elements but evolve in diverging directions. The relationship between improving the ISS and developing 
the DSLS depends on the commonality and the differences between ISS ECLSS and DSLS requirements.  
III. Life support requirements for ISS and deep space 
What are the life support requirements for future space missions, for deep space beyond the Earth-Moon system, 
for Mars? How do they differ from the life support requirements for the space station in LEO? The crew’s basic 
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daily requirements for life support are determined by fundamental human physiology and are similar everywhere. 
Gravity environment, workload, and EVA can increase peak and average metabolic loads during planetary surface 
missions, but these are quantitative rather than qualitative changes. In contrast, the operational requirements for the 
life support system - including power and thermal interfaces, safety, reliability, maintainability, and reparability - are 
fundamentally mission dependent. The required performance of the life support system changes somewhat, but the 
implementation of the system can be significantly different.  
Ideally, a life support system should be designed “top-down,” from mission requirements, to the systems 
architecture, and then the subsystem technologies. However schedule and budget realities and the critical importance 
of operational experience in developing robust and reliable systems may drive a more evolutionary approach. We 
already have a standard architecture using the well understood technologies of the ISS ECLSS. The current task is to 
see how well the ISS ECLSS fits the requirements and design considerations for deep space.  
A. Mission segment based life support requirements for ISS and Mars 
We consider life support system requirements for three mission segments, for ISS ECLSS for LEO, a Mars 
transit DSLS, and a Mars surface DSLS. An overview the parameters of these mission segments with their 
associated system benefits and costs is shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. ISS and Mars mission segment parameters and life support system benefits and costs. 
Category Item # ISS 
Mars 
transit Mars surface 
Propulsion cost 1 1 10 10 
Travel time 2 hours ~ 6 months ~ 6 months 
Duration 3 10 years ~ 1 year ~ 1.5 years 
Quiescent waiting 4 none ~ 1.5 years limited1 
Environment 5 LEO deep space Mars surface 
EVA time 6 limited very little2 much 
Sun light cycle 7 92 minutes full sun 24 hours, 37 minutes 
Gravity 8 ~ 0 g ~ 0 g ~ 1/3 g 
Radiation 9 Earth shielded maximum Mars shielded 
Planetary material 10 none none atmosphere, regolith 
Mission segment 
parameters 
Total risk 11 low high very high 
Life support performance 12 standard reduced reduced 
System benefits Reliability of 
performance 13 low high high 
Radiation protection 14 some high some/regolith? 
Life Cycle Cost 15 high much higher much higher 
Crew time 16 high much higher much higher 
System costs 
Pr(Loss of Crew) 17 low high high 
1 Operational verification of pre-emplaced surface systems prior to crew departure is included in some scenarios.  
2There are possible EVA’s for contingency responses for external systems and crew supported deep space 
experiments.  
 
The mission segment affects the life support requirements and system design through four key mission 
parameters, the propulsion cost, the travel time, the mission duration, and the space or planetary environment. The 
environment in turn determines the Extravehicular Activity (EVA) time, sun light cycle, gravity, radiation, available 
material, and expected risk. The life support system benefits are its performance, the quantity and quality of 
materials and functions, and the reliability of its performance. The system costs include the necessary radiation 
protection, the system’s Life Cycle Cost, (LCC) the crew time needed to operate and maintain the system, and the 
Probability of Loss of Crew [Pr(LOC)].  
System design requires making trade-offs between conflicting benefits and costs. No one design can optimize all 
the mission objectives. Often one or two key mission objectives control the major design decisions. Avoiding the 
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worst problems may determine the final design choice (Rechtin, 1991; Aslaksen, 1992). Planetary protection 
requirements for Mars should influence the DSLS design.  
The largest potential problem, the greatest risk for life support is that the system will fail and the crew will be 
lost. In LEO, probably only a loss of atmosphere could be fatal. On the Moon or anywhere in the Earth-Moon 
system, loss of carbon dioxide removal capability could be fatal in a few hours or days. In deep space, on a Mars 
mission, lack of water or even food would also cause a loss of the crew. For most life support failures within the 
Earth-Moon system, supplied parts or materials or a crew return can be provided in a few days.  
Clearly, since a life support failure in deep space creates a much larger risk to the crew, deep space life support 
reliability is much more critical than it is for the ISS ECLSS. However, ultra-reliability is difficult and expensive to 
achieve and there are many other important considerations, such as launch mass and crew time for operation. High 
reliability was desired for ISS but it must have higher priority in allocating resources and programmatic decisions 
for a deep space mission since the consequences of failure are much more severe. A balanced systems engineering 
approach including all considerations is necessary to achieve the correctly balanced design.  
B. Overview of similarities and differences in mission requirements for ISS and Mars 
This section gives an overview comparison of the requirements for life support systems in LEO or deep space 
based on Table 3. A detailed analysis of all seventeen items in Table 3 is given in an Appendix. 
The ISS mission parameters are somewhat similar to those of Mars transit, considering vacuum, little or no 
EVA, microgravity, and no planetary material, items number 5, 6, 8, and 10. Therefore, ISS is a good test bed for a 
Mars transit DSLS. However the DSLS will experience higher radiation.  
The Mars transit and Mars surface mission parameters and life support systems are very similar. They have 
similar propulsion cost, travel time, operational duration, and risk, and they require similar performance, reliability, 
cost, and Probability of Loss of Crew [Pr(LOC)]. Mars transit and surface are similar in 8 of the 17 items, numbers 
1, 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 17. They differ in deep space or planetary environment and their effects, the 7 items 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10, and 14. These are Environment, EVA time, Sun light cycle, Gravity, Radiation, Planetary material, and 
Radiation protection. Items 4 and 16 are unclear. Quiescent waiting is required for the transit system during the 
surface visit, but not necessarily for the surface system. If the surface system is pre-emplaced and checked out 
before crew departure, a six months quiescent waiting time is required. Crew time is more readily available during 
transit, but the surface system may be more complicated due to the use of atmosphere resources. 
Would we design the same DSLS for Mars surface and Mars transit? Possibly, but probably not. The transit 
system could work on the surface, but the optimum transit system would probably need more radiation protection 
and use more crew time than the optimum surface system. And a transit system could not take advantage of the 
gravity and resources available on the surface.  
The differences between ISS and the Mars missions are much greater. It was noted that ISS is similar to Mars 
transit in vacuum, little or no EVA, microgravity, and no planetary material, items 5, 6, 8, and 10. Two ISS mission 
parameters are somewhat similar to those of Mars surface, both having a sun light cycle and planetary radiation 
shielding, items 7 and 9. Overall, ISS is different from either Mars transit or Mars surface or both in all 17 mission 
parameters and life support system benefits and costs. One ISS difference would tend to make ISS life support 
systems more suitable for deep space. The ten-year duration of ISS, item 3, would justify highly efficient and 
reliable systems that would be very suitable for deep space.  
Would we design the same life support for ISS and Mars transit? It seems not. Could we use a matured and 
upgraded, designed and paid for, flight qualified ISS ECLSS for Mars transit? It would be a poor fit. Should we use 
ISS ECLSS as starting point and guide for the DSLS? Definitely yes. We must consider the changes to ISS ECLSS 
that would be beneficial for Mars transit.  
C. Modifications to ISS ECLSS for Mars transit 
What are the further improvements we would make to a matured and upgraded ISS ECLSS for Mars transit? The 
above discussion and the differences between ISS and Mars requirements described in the Appendix suggest the 
following: 
1. Higher closure and lower system mass, but only if cost-effective. 
2. Higher reliability, maintainability, and reparability.  
3. Design for quiescent waiting.  
4. Hardening for deep space radiation.  
5. A changed quantity of life support materials, especially water, to reflect changed costs and needs. 
6. Higher development cost for mass reduction, autonomy, higher reliability, and radiation hardening.  
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7. Higher planned crew time for a lower level maintenance and repair approach and significant design for 
repair to limit the severity of this impact.  
The first item includes two indirect goals, closure and lower mass. The last three items are the expected costs and 
penalties, probably changed quantity of life support, higher development cost, and higher crew time. There are only 
three actual performance requirements for Mars transit that an ideal matured ISS ECLSS would not provide. These 
are first, higher reliability, maintainability, and reparability, second, quiescent waiting, and third, design for deep 
space radiation. Obtaining these is the fundamental reason that deep space life support must go beyond ISS ECLSS.  
D. ISS issues 
ISS ECLSS is successfully operational, with an architecture and subsystem technologies derived from decades of 
research and planning. However, operations over several years have revealed unanticipated problems that have 
forced redesigns and compensating procedures. Questions have arisen about some of the design decisions and even 
some of the development processes used. The ISS ECLSS problem areas of interest in planning for DSLS include 
reliability, maintenance, sizing, and testing. 
1. Reliability 
ISS ECLSS reliability has been much lower than anticipated. Russell and Klaus state “total ECLSS maintenance 
for 865 days was found to exceed the design estimate by a factor of 22.” A contributing factor was the oxygen 
generation system’s greater than expected failure rate (Russell and Klaus, 2007; Jones and Ewert, 2010). Failures 
continue with no dramatic maturity increase or significant reliability growth (Hodgson, et al., 2013; Jones, 2014a). 
The ISS ECLSS does not use built-in redundancy. The ISS Water Recovery system (WRS) does not have redundant 
systems to increase reliability. “The WRS will be designed to be zero fault tolerant for functionality.” (MSFC-
SPEC-2841, 2004; Jones, 2008) Operations are more secure due to the presence of the diverse redundant Russian 
ECLSS systems. Improved reliability would be a benefit for ISS and is even more needed for DSLS.  
2. Maintenance and repair 
If a failure occurs in the ISS ECLSS, the failed system must be repaired. The ISS maintenance concept depends 
on Orbital Replacement Units, (ORU’s), which are subsystems that can be readily replaced when the operating unit 
either passes its design life or fails. Use of ORU’s saves crew time but requires the transportation and stocking of 
more units than are likely to be used, since achieving high reliability means ORU’s must be available to repair even 
unlikely failures. Transportation of the relatively large ORU’s is now much more difficult after the retirement of the 
Shuttle. Using lower level repair will reduce the mass and volume of spare parts, but will require numerically more 
spares, tools, test equipment, training, and crew time.  
In a detailed review of ISS WRS failures and the lessons learned, it was stated that it would be much better to be 
able to replace small failed components rather than large ORU’s, presumably because of the difficulty of 
maintaining stocks of ORU’s and the delay in providing them when unexpectedly needed (Carter, 2010; Jones, 
2010) Systems design should segregate the failure causes in the smallest, most easily replaceable parts. The ISS 
failure database should be used to identify failure causes that should be reduced in the DSLS and to help design the 
best possible repair or replacement scenarios for the remaining anticipated failures. Spare parts require inventory 
management and increased launch mass and volume. Maintenance and repair may cause secondary failure, e.g.. 
leaking or failed mechanical joints and seals.  
3. Protoflight 
The ISS ECLSS components were developed as “protoflight” hardware. The expense of a conventional flight 
qualification program was considered unaffordable. System and integration testing was limited, Studies of spacecraft 
testing show that subsystem tests do not discover all the subsystem errors and that system level testing finds many 
subsystem as well as system level problems. Space station designers argued that the ability to repair problems on 
board allowed them to accept, or rather transfer, more risk (Jones, 2007).  
Testing is to engineering as experiment is to science, the assessment of reality. With insufficient testing, 
reasonable expectations may be disappointed. “The use of partially matured, proto-flight ECLSS on the ISS has 
resulted in extensive on-orbit repairs and modifications and has relied on extensive resupply and support from 
Earth.” (Hodgson et al., 2012) Conditions limited investment in test and integration that might have made the ISS 
ESLSS more robust.  
4. Sizing 
The amount of water provided for the crew for hygiene on ISS was greatly reduced from the amount planned for 
SSF. The designed capacity of the ISS WRS seems to exceed ISS requirements. (Jones, Appendix A, 2008-01-2193) 
Experience on ISS has allowed the estimated required amount of water to be significantly further reduced (Jones, 
2008). “This reduction dramatically affects ECLSS equipment sizing, expendables requirements and system design 
trades.” (Hodgson et al., 2012) 
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5. Summary 
The ISS ECLSS is less reliable than desired, has a now unworkable maintenance and repair concept, and has a 
water processor oversized for changing requirements. The ISS ECLSS designers have identified many other needed 
enhancements, as indicated previously. ISS ECLSS requires considerable improvement. Any improvements would 
be useful for DSLS, but DSLS requires further and different advancements than ISS ECLSS.  
IV. ISS ECLSS platform based development of DSLS 
The current approach to developing the DSLS is through ISS ECLSS maturation and upgrades, but DSLS must 
achieve performance beyond current requirements for ISS ECLSS. However, the ISS ECLSS architecture, technical 
knowledge, and the operational on-board system itself should be used as the starting point and foundational platform 
for DSLS development. Changes, whether to improve performance or to achieve new and difficult requirements, 
will be easier to accomplish by replacing one subsystem and one function at a time on ISS. The ISS ECLSS provides 
a unique test bed for identifying microgravity problems and integrating and testing new systems.  
A. Platform based approach 
The DSLS should adopt the ISS ECLSS system architecture and subsystem function definitions. These have 
been understood and accepted for more than forty years. The recommended approach to DSLS is a separately 
funded program to develop and test life support technologies on the ground, in independent test space flight, on the 
ISS integrated into an evolving ISS ECLSS, and then as a new DSLS in a new human space habitat beyond LEO for 
radiation exposure but within the Earth-Moon system for crew safety. Independent program funding is needed 
because the priorities and objectives of DSLS differ from ISS or advanced research. Ground test is required to 
establish reliability, flight test to identify microgravity issues, integration with or on ISS to solve integration 
problems, and test beyond ISS in LEO to experience deep space radiation and demonstrate autonomy, without being 
too far for quick resupply or return.  
The ISS is necessary. “(T)he ISS has provided both the complex, in-space, long duration manned test 
environment that has exposed system weaknesses and the robust, forgiving, near-Earth operational environment that 
allows safe, iterative improvement and maturation of those technologies.” (Hodgson, et al., 2012) Using ISS to 
develop DSLS will be a consummate fulfillment of the purpose of the space station. The ISS will benefit from 
improved life support reliability and operability.  
B. Research and development approaches 
The suggested development path for DSLS is based on the unique resource of ISS. The usual NASA research 
and development program is a progression from basic research at low TRL’s thorough proof of concept, prototypes, 
and flight qualification at higher TRL’s. It is difficult to obtain funding for a flight system and to persuade the 
intended user to adopt the technology. This approach is followed in life support development but has not yet 
replaced any of the 1980’s era space station hardware technologies.  
Industrial R&D is classified as either incremental short term improvements to a current product, with low risk 
and low payoff, or innovative new product development, with possible high payoff in the future but high risk of no 
payoff. Because of the different risks and payoffs, new product projects cannot directly compete with incremental 
projects for funding. Immediate safe opportunities are usually preferred to risky investment in the future, so a 
separate allocation of funding is needed for innovative work to be pursued. NASA has recently increased its 
emphasis on innovation by separately organizing and funding advanced technology. Deep space life support 
similarly requires separate funding to prevent diversion to ISS ECLSS problems or other urgent needs.  
Platform based evolution is usual in computer system families, which have well defined architectures and 
subsystems. Any of the keyboard, display, processor, memory, and operating system can be upgraded independently 
within the systems architecture. Recycling life support is similarly suitable for platform based upgrades. The original 
ISS ECLSS subsystems were selected by comparing two different technologies head-to-head for each function. 
(Carrasquillo, Carter, et al., 1992) Familiar or innovative subsystem technologies can be developed as replacements.  
C. Development and ground test 
The space station subsystems should be redesigned to meet the higher reliability and other requirements for deep 
space, to take advantage of the lessons learned on space station, and to use the many advances in design engineering 
over the last thirty years. The ultimate goal of DSLS subsystem development is to achieve verified satisfactory 
reliability, maintainability, and reparability. This can be done only by designing for high reliability and ease of 
maintenance. To experimentally measure a failure rate, testing must be done until some failures are produced. 
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Usually new complex space systems cannot have low failure rates verified by test, because of the high cost of 
multiple unit, multiple year testing. Since long multiple unit testing is costly, requirements for high reliability are 
usually verified by analysis. High reliability can be verified by analysis only if the system is designed for high 
reliability, using components with tested high reliability and following good design principles, such as derating and 
parallel redundancy. Unfortunately, specification and design errors may introduce unanticipated failure modes that 
are not detected by routine paper analysis. Life support experience has shown that failure rates are higher, usually 
much higher, than indicated by analysis. (Likens, 1992)  
Achieving high reliability for long life systems requires repeated cycles of redesign, test, operation, failure, 
failure analysis, and redesign. Initial systems testing often reveals major problems that require redesign. When these 
are solved, many smaller problems usually appear. Cutting the failure rate in half can take as much time and effort 
as the original system development (Rechtin, 1991; Jones and Kliss, 2006).  
“A plan should be established to achieve the needed reliability. The required system reliability should be 
analyzed and allocated to subsystems and components. Technologies, materials, and components should be selected 
to improve reliability. Planning must include life testing of components to confirm their reliability and 
maintainability and spares requirements must be defined. The design should isolate the predominant failure modes 
in small, low mass, easily replaceable components. Analysis and test data must confirm that the system is capable of 
the required ultra reliability. The subsystems and integrated systems should be tested sufficiently to discover design 
errors that may cause failures.” (Jones and Ewert, 2010)  
If the DSLS subsystems do not have sufficient reliability, it may be necessary to provide multiple redundant 
subsystems. To avoid common cause failures, the redundant subsystems should be technically diverse but using 
different technologies for redundant subsystems would greatly increase the development and launch cost of the 
DSLS and reduce opportunities for common spares and maturation.  
“For ECLSS that require long lead times for technology maturation, systems development must start in the very 
near future in order to deploy usable and reliable systems in the intermediate (5- 10 year) future.” (Hodgson et al., 
2013) It is later than we think. Compensating for lost time will require a greatly increased budget. We will need all 
of the time we have.  
D. Flight tests 
“ECLS technology maturation must include extended in-space operation. ECLSS experience on ISS includes 
numerous examples of issues that were not and could not reasonably be predicted, simulated and corrected solely in 
ground based test and analysis efforts. Despite great advances in our understanding of microgravity effects, fluid 
physics, human biology, and chemistry, the complex interactions of multiple effects in a functioning manned 
spacecraft over a long duration continues to stretch the boundaries of our imagination and challenge ECLSS designs 
in unexpected ways.” (Hodgson, et al., 2012)  
1. Independent flight test 
DSLS subsystems should be tested in space as soon as possible. Microgravity failure mechanisms can be 
identified and repair procedures demonstrated. The ISS is the obvious place for flight tests, but initial testing in an 
independent spacecraft would reduce the impact on ISS.  
2. Integrated test on ISS 
DSLS subsystems should be tested on the ISS as integrated components in an evolving ISS ECLSS. They should 
be operated as part of the ISS ECLSS to acquire long in-space test time.  
3. Test beyond LEO 
“The need to “test as you fly” to fully mature long duration ECLS systems will ultimately limit the use of ISS as 
a testbed for exploration ECLS technologies. By design, the ISS operates in low-Earth orbit, protected from deep 
space radiation by the Earth’s magnetic field. It is also designed for operation at an atmosphere equivalent to sea 
level on Earth. These two factors drive the need for a separate platform for ECLSS maturation through exposure to 
deep space radiation environment and exploration atmospheres. This need can be met by an ISS-derived exploration 
platform at an Earth-moon libration point.” (Hodgson et al., 2012)  
V. Conclusion 
Future human space exploration will include the first trip in deep space to Mars, with no resupply, no rescue, and 
no escape if life support fails. A highly reliable deep space life support system should be developed as soon as 
possible, since it will require a long time to develop and test. The suggested approach is to use the space station life 
support system as a development platform, adopting its systems architecture and replacing as necessary its 
subsystems one-by-one with high reliability technologies suitable for the deep space voyage to Mars.  
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Experience suggests that maturation in as close to actual mission environments and operations as possible is 
essential and will need to encompass multiple replications and mission durations to establish confidence in 
robustness and definition of sparing requirements that will support initial deep space exploration missions. To 
commit to those missions we will need high confidence that the ECLSS design will support safe return for the crew 
with a consumable inventory and equipment complement that will not impose unsupportable launch mass penalties. 
To accomplish this we will need to operate exploration relevant ECLSS on ISS and on an anticipated future node in 
the lunar neighborhood as well in ground integration test facilities and we will need all of the time we have. This 
demands that the space life support community must overcome budgetary pressure (that we have already seen and 
can be sure will continue) to scale back ECLS systems and operations in near or on-lunar missions to the bare 
minimum. Recent suggestions for simple applications of largely non-regenerative technologies in near term missions 
beyond LEO because they meet specific mission needs and can reduce mission costs make this issue clear. If that 
path is pursued, operational data for advanced closed loop ECLSS in relevant environments will be insufficient to 
support LOC goals and mission provisioning decisions. Prudent program managers for exploration missions will see 
no viable ECLS options except flying essentially what we have on ISS today (or even simpler and less advanced 
technologies) to minimize risk and cost with significant resulting mission limitations and risks to the crew.  
Appendix: Item by item differences between ISS and Mars requirements 
The items of Table 3 are examined one by one to determine the detailed differences between ISS and Mars 
requirements.  
Mission parameters. The mission affects life support requirements through cost, time, and environment. 
1. Propulsion cost. Using conventional propulsion, providing the Mars transit and return rocket and fuel requires 
10.2 times the mass of the payload in LEO. Similarly, providing the Mars transit and descent rockets and their fuel 
requires 9.6 times the mass of the payload in LEO (Price et al., 2009, Jones, 2013c). The launch and emplacement 
cost for life support hardware, materials, and spares will be about ten times higher in deep space than in LEO. The 
savings in propulsion cost achieved by increasing closure and reducing total system mass are ten times higher in 
deep space than in LEO. This suggests that deep space systems should be designed for higher closure and lower 
mass than LEO systems. However, increasing closure is not justified if the total system mass increases. And 
decreasing total system mass is not justified if the total Life Cycle Cost (LCC) increases. Propulsion cost is only one 
element of LCC, and it is usually lower than the system development cost (Jones, 2013c). Advanced propulsion may 
significantly reduce future costs.  
2. Travel time. The trip to Mars requires about six months, while LEO can be reached in a few hours. The travel 
time effectively prohibits providing systems, parts, or materials in response to a failure, or bringing back the crew in 
an emergency. The long travel time to Mars requires life support with higher reliability, maintainability, and 
reparability, achieved autonomously by design, spares, and redundancy. 
3. Duration. The long duration of the ISS and Mars missions requires long life, high reliability life support. 
However, the possibilities of prompt resupply or return from LEO make the penalty for failure much more 
affordable in LEO. A failure that is an inconvenience in LEO can cause Loss of Crew in deep space. The mass of 
oxygen, water, and food consumed by the crew increases directly with duration. This suggests that long duration 
systems should be designed for higher closure, if that is cost-effective.  
4. Quiescent waiting. The Mars transit system, expected to remain in Mars orbit for 1.5 years, requires a long 
term quiescent waiting ability, while ISS does not. Although there would be no crew consumption of water and 
oxygen, and the system will usually be quiescent, microbial contamination and corrosion are possible. 
5. Environment. LEO, deep space, and the Mars surface have different EVA time, sun light cycle, gravity, 
radiation, available material, and expected risk. 
6. EVA time. ISS requires limited EVA, and a deep space transit vehicle probably will need little or none, but 
exploration of the surface of Mars will require extensive EVA. EVA can have a significant impact on the life 
support system. The physical effort of EVA requires additional life support consumables and the suit cooling water 
and exhaled carbon dioxide will probably be lost.  Provision for airlock operations can also have a significant impact 
and may dominate mission requirements for atmosphere diluent gas and introduce new contaminants and air and 
water treatment needs.  
7. Sun light cycle. The rapid orbit of ISS, the deep space location of Mars transit, and the rotation of Mars 
produce different solar illumination. If solar power is used, the requirement for battery storage at night will make its 
cost highest on the Mars surface. Mars has about half the solar illumination of Earth. Mars surface could reduce the 
effectiveness of solar power on Mars.  
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8. Gravity. Microgravity has caused problems for ISS ECLSS. Proven operation in microgravity would be 
necessary for a Mars transit DSLS system.  
9. Radiation. The ISS is shielded by Earth’s mass and magnetic field, and a Mars surface base is shielded by 
Mars’ mass and atmosphere. A deep space transit vehicle is exposed to more solar and cosmic radiation. This may 
require life support designed for deep space radiation or at least tested in deep space and may significantly influence 
design trades by altering mission benefits and penalties associated with increasing consumable materials mass that 
could add to radiation shielding for the crew and mission equipment.  
10. Planetary material. The atmosphere and regolith of the Mars surface could provide important life support 
materials.  
11. Risk. The long travel time to Mars greatly increases mission risk by preventing aiding or bringing back the 
crew in an emergency. The Mars surface mission has the additional risk factors of descent, exploration EVA, and 
ascent.  
System benefits. The life support system must provide sufficient quantity and quality of materials, such as 
oxygen and water, and functions, such as carbon dioxide removal, with the needed reliability of performance.  
12. Life support performance. The quantity of material required, particularly water, for ISS was significantly 
reduced from the original requirements for SSF. The crew daily allowance of water was further reduced during the 
Constellation Program. The cost and difficulty of providing life support in deep space could suggest providing a 
lower quantity of water than provided by ISS, or the water allowance could increase to allow crew showers and 
perhaps provide radiation shielding in transit or laundry and cleaning to help mitigate Mars dust (Jones, 2008).  
13. Reliability of performance. The long travel time to Mars, by preventing the quick supply of spare parts or 
crew return, directly forces higher mission reliability (including possible repairs with preplanned logistics) while the 
long operating time of ISS does not. Extremely high reliability would be desirable for ISS but clearly is not 
absolutely necessary because emergency support from Earth or emergency return on short notice are available 
options.  
System costs. The system costs include any provided radiation protection, LCC, crew time, and the Pr(LOC).  
14. Radiation protection. The maximum solar and cosmic radiation received by a deep space transit vehicle may 
require the cost of design for deep space radiation and testing in deep space. 
15. Life Cycle Cost. LCC includes the system development cost, the launch or propulsion cost, and the operating 
cost. The operating cost is typically about ten percent of the system development cost per year (Jones, 2013c). The 
propulsion cost is about ten times higher for Mars than for LEO. The system development cost will be higher for 
deep space than for LEO, due to the needs for mass reduction, autonomy, higher reliability, and possibly radiation 
hardening.  
16. Crew time. The ISS crew spends about half its time on operation, maintenance, and repair, and the ISS 
ECLSS has required more time than anticipated. However, the current ISS maintenance approach is considered 
unsatisfactory, and a lower level, more crew time intensive approach has been suggested (Carter, 2010; Jones, 
2010). Given the need for higher mission reliability with limited mass and volume for spares, much higher crew 
time use to support the DSLS can be expected, and significant design effort to improve maintainability and limit 
MTTR may be required to avoid adverse impact on mission objectives.  
17. Probability of Loss of Crew. Pr(LOC) due to a life support failure is low for a crew on ISS, because of good 
system performance, ground support and resupply in response to system failures, and also especially because of the 
option of an emergency return to Earth. The Pr(LOC) in deep space may be higher because of the lack of an 
emergency return capability, and also because it may not be possible to achieve a sufficiently high system reliability 
without any Earth based contingency resupply capability.  
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